Satellite operators, machine shops, construction firms, and heavy equipment fleets share something their industry classifications rarely capture: they depend on software and connected infrastructure to deliver their core services. A manufacturing plant monitors production through cloud-connected systems, and a construction company manages equipment and project data on digital platforms. A satellite operator relies on ground stations, communications networks, and software to keep control of assets hundreds of kilometers above Earth.

These businesses are still defined by their physical operations, but their cybersecurity responsibilities extend well beyond the hardware. Presidential directives on space systems and critical infrastructure recognize the role cybersecurity plays in industries built on machinery, transportation, and industrial production, and government contractors face requirements tied to the information they handle whether their primary business is manufacturing equipment or developing software.

The challenge is knowing which requirements apply, where the risk sits, and how to protect connected systems without disrupting the physical operations they support. What follows are the compliance myths still creating unnecessary exposure across hardware-centric industries.

Myth: Air-gapped industrial systems are inherently secure

Engineers designed operational technology (OT) to keep physical systems running, so industrial controllers, manufacturing equipment, and building automation systems prioritize availability, reliability, and safety. Ranking uptime made physical separation an appealing strategy: disconnect industrial equipment from business networks and external systems, so the attack surface stays limited.

Modern operations can complicate the approach. Manufacturers use predictive maintenance and digital twins to monitor equipment performance, while construction firms manage machinery remotely across multiple jobsites. Fleet operators collect diagnostic data through connected vehicles, and each connection adds another interface between physical infrastructure and the software supporting it. The operational benefits are substantial, but so are the security implications.

The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, and more recently, the Iranian cyberattacks on U.S. water systems, shows how a disruption to business systems can halt physical operations without a confirmed compromise of industrial control systems. This lesson extends beyond pipelines: an organization needs confidence in the separation between its IT and OT environments, along with a tested response plan for when the separation is uncertain.

Federal guidance has followed the same logic. President Biden’s National Security Memorandum 5 directed federal agencies to develop cybersecurity performance goals for critical infrastructure control systems, and the resulting work informed CISA’s voluntary Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, a framework for prioritizing security measures across IT and OT environments. NIST then broadened its industrial security guidance in SP 800-82 Revision 3, extending its scope from industrial control systems to operational technology as a whole.

The guidance weighs the performance, reliability, and safety requirements of physical equipment alongside cybersecurity. Controls built for enterprise IT cannot always transfer directly to industrial machinery, where equipment availability, operational timing, and physical safety remain essential engineering constraints. The goal is to secure the connections modern operations require, with controls suited to the systems on either side.

Myth: Cybersecurity can be addressed separately from manufacturing system design

A modern production facility runs on digital manufacturing systems, automated assembly lines, connected machinery, and cloud-based analytics, and each component forces decisions about access, vendor relationships, data handling, and the systems responsible for maintaining production.

The Trump administration launched Foundry School, an advanced manufacturing workforce initiative under the State Department’s Pax Silica effort, to build the technical workforce behind American manufacturing, including skills for advanced production systems, factory design, and industrial operations. Pax Silica’s mission centers on trusted technology supply chains and the infrastructure supporting strategically important industries.

Foundry School sets no cybersecurity requirements of its own but instead sets them based on the industrial environments it is built to support. As manufacturing capacity expands, companies face decisions about how production equipment connects to enterprise systems, which vendors can access industrial networks, and how sensitive information moves between engineering teams and external partners. Choices about connections, vendor access, and data flows shape a facility’s security long before production begins.

For example, a machine shop producing components for a program run by the Department of War, for example, may use third-party or their own cloud software to store engineering files, coordinate suppliers, and manage production schedules. When the software processes, stores, or transmits Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), the contract’s cybersecurity requirements ensure that the information flowing through every system boundary is held to its contractual obligations.

For manufacturers, cybersecurity is not only an IT responsibility, it is an engineering and procurement decision. Secure production requires knowing which systems are connected, which information they handle, and who is accountable for protecting them.

Myth: Physical isolation reduces the cybersecurity risks facing space systems

A satellite may operate hundreds or thousands of kilometers above Earth, but distance gives it little protection against attacks on the systems controlling it. Spacecraft depend on software, ground stations, command networks, and communications links, and compromising any one of them can disrupt the mission without physical access to the spacecraft.

The federal government formally recognized the cyber threat to satellites and their supporting systems when President Trump issued Space Policy Directive-5 (SPD-5), establishing cybersecurity principles for space systems and directing federal agencies to work with commercial space companies to improve cybersecurity practices and resilience across the space industrial base. Its principles cover threats to space assets and supporting infrastructure, including unauthorized access, supply chain vulnerabilities, and communications interference. They set policy, not compliance obligations; binding requirements come from the applicable regulations, contracts, and agency rules.

Security must be designed to protect command and control functions, authenticate communications, secure software updates, and preserve the ability to respond when connectivity degrades or systems behave unexpectedly.

Command authentication, update security, and response planning extend to the ground infrastructure supporting the mission. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Hybrid Satellite Networks (NIST IR 8441) addresses satellite environments assembled from independently owned and operated components, where satellites, payloads, ground terminals, antennas, and supporting services may each run under different security arrangements. The framework focuses on the security of each component and the interfaces connecting them, since an operator cannot assume every participating system provides equivalent assurance.

The challenge will be familiar to anyone operating a multi-tenant cloud environment, where shared infrastructure creates efficiencies but demands clear responsibility for access, security controls, and incident response.

The ground segment can expose an entire mission

The cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT network shows how much a space mission depends on terrestrial cybersecurity. Attackers disrupted satellite broadband across Europe by targeting the network’s ground-based management infrastructure and rendering large numbers of customer modems inoperable. These consequences reached beyond satellite communications causing more than 5,000 wind turbines in Germany to lose remote monitoring because they depended on the compromised network.

Cloud-hosted mission applications, remote access infrastructure, software updates, and third-party integrations all shape ground systems’ risk profile, and operators need to map the dependencies before an incident exposes them. Where the applications support defense missions, the hosting environment’s accreditation status becomes part of the same risk picture; DISA PA Approval: Accelerating DoD Market Access for Tech Innovators explains what a provisional authorization covers and why mission owners weigh it.

For space systems operating across distributed terrestrial stations and edge nodes, software security cannot be confined to standard hyperscale cloud regions. Space operations demand secure software delivery that extends to disconnected ground terminals, transportable antennas, and edge compute environments. Platforms like Second Front’s 2F Frontier bridge this divide, enabling secure containerized software delivery and configuration management to remote and tactical edge endpoints-ensuring that mission updates travel safely from accredited cloud backbones to distributed assets.

Myth: Construction cybersecurity is limited to back-office systems

Construction cybersecurity often gets less attention than the security of the facilities being built. A large project may operate across temporary locations, multiple organizations, and changing networks. Field teams may access files that reside in a government customer’s environment, raising questions about access, accountability, and information protection. The result is a technology environment with unusually complicated boundaries.

A construction company handling CUI under a defense contract may need to implement applicable NIST SP 800-171 requirements in the information systems processing, storing, or transmitting the CUI. A subcontractor receiving protected engineering drawings may face similar requirements when the obligations flow down through its contract.

A major pitfall across hardware and industrial sectors is conflating contractor compliance with software certification. The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) evaluates how an organization protects CUI within its internal corporate networks, laptops, and project repositories. However, CMMC does not accredit cloud software platforms or external digital services.

If a construction contractor deploys a cloud-hosted digital twin, drone mapping platform, or equipment tracking system that processes government data, that application falls under federal frameworks requiring FedRAMP Certification or a U.S. Department of War (DOW) ATO.  Securing your corporate office under CMMC will not grant your cloud software an ATO. For software providers serving these contractors, the viable route to market without a multi-year engineering freeze is inheriting baseline security controls from an accredited cloud foundation.

Myth: Fleet cybersecurity is confined to enterprise IT and dispatch systems

Fleet operators have traditionally organized security around physical access to vehicles and facilities. However, connected vehicles push a fleet’s security boundary out to software, communications networks, and third-party service providers. Fleet management systems collect location data, equipment diagnostics, maintenance records, and operational data. Heavy equipment and commercial vehicles often transmit the data through telematics devices connected to onboard systems. This connectivity helps operators manage dispersed assets, but it also creates dependencies on remote communications and external software.

A compromised telematics account can expose location and operational data, and a vulnerable application programming interface (API) can open fleet information to unauthorized access. A weakness in a connected device raises the stakes when the device also reaches onboard control systems. The consequences are set by the architecture and the privileges available to the compromised component.

A telematics vulnerability does not automatically hand an attacker control of vehicle functions. Security design should evaluate access to business information, diagnostic capabilities, and safety-critical controls separately. There should be explicit boundaries and clearly defined permissions between vehicle systems, telematics gateways, and cloud applications.

For organizations managing large or mixed fleets, the same principles hold across manufacturers and equipment types. NIST SP 800-207 provides the architectural foundation: its zero trust model grants access based on authenticated identities and authorized requests. For software vendors supporting defense missions, zero trust requirements already shape the environments where their applications run. The DOW requires its components to reach Target Level under its zero trust strategy by FY 2027. Vendors building for its systems need to align their architecture early. Implementing Zero Trust: A practical guide for meeting DoD mandates covers the seven pillars and the phased roadmap.

Because heavy equipment and tactical vehicle fleets operate at the physical edge-frequently encountering intermittent connectivity or operating in fully disconnected environments-fleet software cannot rely on a constant connection to centralized cloud infrastructure. Securing these assets requires deploying software to the tactical edge without compromising security baselines. Deploying through edge management platforms like 2F Frontier allows operators to push accredited software updates and enforce containerized security directly onto onboard vehicle systems and edge hardware, maintaining Zero Trust integrity even when disconnected from the enterprise.

Fleet software providers serving defense customers face another layer of requirements. A logistics application deployed for a defense mission may need to run inside an authorized government environment. Additionally, any application handling CUI needs appropriate controls on the systems processing it. As a result, vehicle-level security and the cloud infrastructure behind the fleet become linked. Even when the hardware and software come from different vendors the security responsibilities still have to fit together.

Myth: A favorable SPRS score proves required controls are in place

A favorable score in the Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS) records what a contractor reported about its own controls. It does not prove the controls exist. The distinction carries the most weight inside the defense industrial base. A manufacturer supplying aircraft components, a construction contractor supporting a military installation, and a logistics company handling defense information may all carry cybersecurity requirements through their government contracts.

For covered contractor information systems handling CUI, NIST SP 800-171 establishes requirements for protecting that information, and CMMC introduces an assessment framework for verifying implementation of applicable cybersecurity requirements. Level 2 incorporates the 110 security requirements from NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 under the published CMMC program rule. Although NIST has published Revision 3, the two revisions should not be treated as interchangeable for CMMC compliance; the transition requires the applicable rulemaking.

While the DOW announced the immediate suspension of CMMC Phase II requirements, Phase I self-assessment requirements remain in place, with NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 continuing to underpin enforcement during the review.

For contractors, the practical question is whether their documented security posture reflects the controls actually implemented across their systems. The SPRS holds those self-assessment scores. A favorable score there provides little protection when the underlying systems fail to meet contractual requirements.

A System Security Plan (SSP) must describe the system and its controls accurately, and a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) should identify deficiencies and support their remediation. Federal policy is already moving in that direction, a shift away from snapshot-in-time compliance. The DOW’s new CSRMC: Why Second Front is already there describes this in more detail.

Control inheritance reduces the burden for software providers serving these sectors

The compliance challenges across manufacturing, space, construction, and fleet management share one dependency: software. These industries rely on applications for monitoring, coordination, analytics, and operational decision-making. When the applications serve federal civilian agencies or defense customers, their providers may need to meet government-specific security and authorization requirements. 

An independent software vendor (ISV) faces an architectural choice: build on raw cloud infrastructure and own the implementation and documentation of most required security controls, or deploy onto a pre-accredited platform and shift much of the responsibility to the platform. In the latter, control inheritance is the mechanism. The software provider relies on validated controls the platform already implements, shrinking what it must implement and document itself.

Second Front’s Game Warden platform operationalizes this control-inheritance model for software vendors deploying into government environments. Game Warden holds FedRAMP Class D (High) Certification, a Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Provisional Authorization at Impact Level 5 (IL5), and GovRAMP High status. Software providers can utilize the platform’s accredited infrastructure, automated security processes, and continuous monitoring directly in their government deployment strategy.

How much a vendor inherits depends on the deployment model. In How does control inheritance work for GovRAMP, FedRAMP, and DOW ATOs?, we compare three approaches using our FedRAMP Customer Responsibility Matrix as the accounting baseline.

For software running beyond traditional cloud environments, Second Front’s Frontier platform extends secure software delivery to disconnected and remote edge deployments. This includes drones, vehicles, and other equipment. Edge deployments bring their own operational and security considerations where connectivity and physical access are limited. Each system’s authorization requirements depend on its operating environment.

The approach aligns with the DOW’s Cybersecurity Risk Management Construct (CSRMC), announced as the successor to the Risk Management Framework (RMF). CSRMC leans on automation, continuous monitoring, DevSecOps, and control inheritance to move the DOW toward continuous risk management. Implementation is still underway and RMF remains operative for most efforts, so vendors should plan for current authorization requirements through the transition.

The hardware exemption never existed

Manufacturing, construction, fleet management, and space operations sit in different physical environments, but their cybersecurity problems converge on the same connected systems. Presidential directives address the security of space assets and critical infrastructure. Federal contractor requirements reach into covered information systems throughout the defense supply chain. European rules reach both the operators of critical services and the manufacturers of connected products.

For a hardware-centric organization, the first step is mapping the technology behind its operations and the requirements governing it. For the software vendors serving that technology, the urgent step is to settle security architecture and authorization decisions early, before government deployment requirements force a rebuild.

Speak with our team to learn how 2F Game Warden gets your software into federal and defense environments through an accredited platform.